Ransomware in the Clinic: Emergency Plan for 24 Hours, 72 Hours, and 1 Month
A ransomware incident in a hospital is a care delivery crisis. The roadmap for 24 h, 72 h and the first month - through to the final report to the BSI.

Ransomware in the Clinic: The First 24 Hours, the First 72 Hours, the First Month
Hospitals are among the preferred targets of cyberattacks in Germany, and ransomware is the form of attack with the most severe consequences. That it will happen is no longer the question. The question is: what to do when it happens.
This roadmap is intended for hospital executive boards, IT directors, data protection officers, and crisis team leaders. It outlines the process that has proven effective in real incidents - from the first suspicious screen prompt to the final BSI report after one month. Not as theory, but as an operational playbook.
Three preliminary remarks. First: Anyone who only reads this roadmap during an ongoing incident has already lost. It only works if the structures - crisis team, escalation chain, reporting templates, backup strategy - are established beforehand. Second: A cyberattack in a hospital is not an IT problem. It is a healthcare provision crisis caused by IT. Handling it is managed via the crisis team, not the help desk. Third: NIS2 has significantly increased the pressure. Section 32 of the BSIG mandates an initial 24-hour notification to the BSI, a 72-hour assessment report, and a final report after one month. Anyone who misses these deadlines risks fines of up to €10 million and executive liability toward their own institution under Section 38 of the BSIG. Whether your institution falls under NIS2 at all can be determined in two minutes with our NIS2 readiness check.
The First 30 Minutes - Detection and Containment
A typical scenario begins: An admissions employee can no longer access the HIS. A call comes from radiology reporting that images will not load. The IT hotline simultaneously receives multiple tickets from different wards. What initially looks like a server issue turns out after 15 minutes to be encrypted files.
These first 30 minutes decide whether the incident becomes a controlled crisis or a widespread outage. Three steps are non-negotiable:
1. Rapid triage by IT personnel. Are isolated endpoints affected or is it spreading? Is only the HIS impacted, or also Active Directory, PACS, LIS, pharmacy systems? Initial indicators of ransomware: files with unusual extensions (.lockbit, .ryuk, .conti), ransom notes in directories, disabled endpoint detection, unusual activity in Active Directory logs.
2. Immediate network isolation of affected segments. Disconnect compromised workstations from the network - physically if possible, otherwise via switch port disablement or firewall rules. Critical question: Does the attacker already possess domain admin privileges? If so, the entire domain is compromised. In that case: disconnect all servers from the network, shut down Active Directory, and postpone recovery until after forensic evaluation.
3. Convene the crisis management team. Executive management, IT leadership, medical direction, nursing management, data protection, press office. Ideally based on a predefined list with private telephone numbers and designated deputies. Activate the crisis room - physically, not digitally, because digital communication tools may themselves be compromised.
What does not happen in the first 30 minutes: recovery, forensics, ransom negotiations, external communication. Only three things: detect, contain, escalate.
The First 24 Hours - Triage, Crisis Team, Initial BSI Report
Hours 1 to 4: Damage assessment. Which care processes are affected? Emergency department, OR, ICU, laboratory, imaging, pharmacy, billing, patient identification. Which systems are down? HIS, PACS, LIS, RIS, AD, email, telephony, elevator control, HVAC, access control. Which devices are compromised versus proactively shut down? Which backups are available and unaffected?
In parallel: transition to manual operations. The well-known paper forms from the drawer. Patient identification via wristbands with admission numbers. Medication administered via handwritten orders. Findings communicated via telephone and fax. In 2016, following a ransomware attack, the Lukaskrankenhaus Neuss operated in manual mode for weeks - without loss of life, because the crisis team functioned and the emergency binder was readily accessible.
Hours 4 to 12: Enlisting external support. Three calls are critical:
External IT forensics. Anyone without a contract with an incident response or forensics service provider should call now at the latest - and expect to wait hours for a callback during a crisis. Providers with healthcare experience are rare; know the key firms in advance, and keep emergency contact numbers in the crisis team binder.
Data protection officer. In parallel with the BSI notification, GDPR reporting obligations under Art. 33 GDPR apply. In the event of suspected unauthorized access to or theft of patient data, the competent data protection supervisory authority must be notified within 72 hours. If there is a high risk, the affected individuals must also be notified directly under Art. 34 GDPR.
Insurer. Contact the cyber insurer and report the claim immediately. Many policies require notification within 24 hours; otherwise, coverage is forfeited. Insurers often have their own forensics panels that are already covered by the policy - saving negotiations with unfamiliar vendors during the acute phase.
Hours 12 to 24: Initial BSI notification. Section 32 BSIG requires the initial notification within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant security incident. "Significant" is deliberately not defined narrowly here - in the case of ransomware in a hospital, the incident almost always meets the threshold.
The report is submitted via the BSI reporting portal (Mein-Unternehmenskonto, MUK). Contents are concise:
General description of the incident
Time of detection
Affected systems and healthcare delivery areas
Suspected vector (if already known)
Containment measures taken so far
Accessible point of contact for inquiries
Anyone without an initial notification template prepared will have to draft it under extreme pressure. Pre-drafted templates save 30 to 60 minutes - time that is urgently needed elsewhere within the crisis team.
Hours 24 to 72 - Assessment, Forensics, Assessment Notification
Day 2: Complete containment and start of forensics. Forensics specialists are on-site or connected remotely. Their primary task: preserve evidence without altering its evidentiary value. Disk images of infected systems, logs from firewalls, Active Directory, mail servers, endpoint detection tools. Collecting these logs before initiating system restarts is non-negotiable - afterward, it is too late.
In parallel, three critical decisions must be addressed:
Pay the ransom - yes or no? In Germany, payment is not illegal per se, but it can become a criminal offense if a proven link to sanctioned entities exists (e.g., listed on EU sanctions lists). The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) fundamentally advises against payment. Cyber insurers often do not cover ransom payments or only do so under strict conditions. In practice: even after payment, complete recovery is not guaranteed - decryptors are frequently flawed, data remains partially unusable, and double extortion (decryption key plus threat of data publication) is common.
Recovery strategy. Restore from backups or rebuild from scratch? Backups must be verified as clean before reconnection - some ransomware strains linger in the network for weeks and also infect older backups. A clean restoration often requires new hardware or completely fresh installations from reliably clean images.
External communication. Patients, relatives, referring physicians, local media. The press office coordinates, and approved statements must be signed off by executive management. Crucial: clear communication regarding what is operational (emergency care is maintained, emergency room accessible) and what is not (elective surgeries postponed, appointments rescheduled). False reassurances backfire as soon as the truth becomes apparent.
Hour 72: BSI assessment notification. Contents:
Detailed impact on healthcare operations
Severity classification
Status of implemented measures
Initial findings regarding root cause (initial vector, timeline)
Estimated timeframe for full recovery
The GDPR notification to the responsible data protection authority is due concurrently if patient data is affected. Both submissions often occur on the same day - separate filings, separate authorities, no combined procedure.
Day 3 to Day 30 - Restoration and Final Report
The phase that receives the least attention in practice - and takes the longest.
Days 3 to 7: Prioritized recovery. The sequence is not driven by IT preferences, but by healthcare priority. First, systems directly affecting patients (HIS, PACS, LIS, pharmacy), then administration. This is a clinical decision, not a technical one. Per system: rebuild from verified backups or perform fresh installation, apply patches, harden configurations, reconnect incrementally to the network, execute functional tests, and intensify monitoring.
Days 8 to 21: Stabilization. The systems are running again, but under close observation. Extended logs, endpoint detection on all critical machines, frequent backup integrity checks. Staff also require training - often all passwords must be reset, new workflows take effect, and clear escalation paths apply. At Lukaskrankenhaus in 2016, all employees had to switch to 16-character passwords and adopt a new security concept.
In parallel: remediation measures. What enabled the attack in the first place? In a typical hospital incident, there are one to three vulnerabilities: an unpatched internet-facing server, a phishing email containing a macro attachment, or compromised maintenance credentials of a third-party vendor. These are remediated before normal operations resume - not afterward.
Day 30: Final BSI report. Contents:
Comprehensive review of the incident
Confirmed root cause
Consequences - damages, affected data, recovery costs
Lessons learned and concrete adaptations to the security concept
Planned subsequent steps
This report is not merely a formality - it forms the defense basis in the event of subsequent fine proceedings, civil litigation, or insurance disputes. Draft it meticulously, attach the forensic report, have it formally approved by the executive management, and file it in the ISMS records.
The Most Common Mistakes in the Initial Hours
Following real-world incidents, clear patterns emerge. Four mistakes prove the most costly:
"Let's see if we can resolve this ourselves first." Attempting to proceed without professional forensics destroys evidence and increases the risk of reinfection. In the event of any serious suspicion: bring in external experts immediately - even if it ultimately turns out to be a false alarm.
"We can report to the BSI later; we are too busy right now." The 24-hour deadline begins upon becoming aware of a significant incident. It is non-negotiable. Missing it risks fines regardless of the actual damage caused by the incident itself.
"We don't need a crisis team; IT can handle this." This approach fails. Healthcare provision decisions, communication issues, staffing concerns, vendor coordination, external forensics, regulatory liaison - IT alone possesses neither the mandate nor the resources. Crisis management in a hospital is an executive responsibility from minute one.
"Just restore from backups and we'll be fine." Backups managed within the same Active Directory domain are frequently compromised as well. Most modern ransomware strains deliberately target and delete backups prior to encryption. Only offline or immutable backups are dependable - and even those must be verified before reconnection.
What Must Be Done Before an Incident Occurs
An operational roadmap only works when backed by preparation. Six foundational elements must be established beforehand:
1. Documented crisis management structure. Who is included, who serves as deputy, private telephone numbers, explicit competencies, and escalation thresholds. Biannual reviews, distributed as physical cards to all crisis team members.
2. Physical emergency binder available. On paper, not within the IT infrastructure. Contents: crisis team contact lists, forensics vendors, BSI contact details, MUK access, insurance policies, sample templates for all three reports, admission and clinical documentation forms for manual operations. Stored in at least two physically separate locations.
3. 3-2-1 backup strategy with an offline component. Three copies, two media types, one kept offline or immutable. Quarterly tested restorations, fully documented. For hyperscaler backups: multi-factor authentication for backup administrators, with identities isolated from production AD.
4. Tabletop exercise at least once a year. Half-day simulation of a cyberattack involving the actual crisis management team. Evaluate what works and what does not. Vulnerabilities surface painlessly during an exercise - in a real-world crisis, they prove exceptionally costly.
5. Pre-negotiated forensics retainer. Standby contracts with defined service level agreements (SLAs). Ideally, annual test engagements so the provider is familiar with your environment beforehand rather than learning your network topology during an active crisis.
6. Documented escalation paths. Who decides what, and at what point? Who holds the authority to sever internet connections? Who interfaces with the media? Who assumes legal liability for specific decisions? These determinations must be formally documented and known to all stakeholders.
NIS2 compliance under Section 30 BSIG demands nothing less. Hospitals lacking these capabilities will not only face extreme challenges during an attack - they remain exposed from a regulatory standpoint and defenseless in administrative fine proceedings.
Lessons from Real-World Cases
Lukaskrankenhaus Neuss (February 2016). Weeks of manual operations following a ransomware attack. The crisis team functioned effectively, and patient care was maintained. Lesson: Advance planning for manual operations - including rehearsed paper forms and established telephone trees - is critical to survival.
Klinikum Lippe (November 2022). Following intense negotiations, systems were decrypted. The issue of whether a ransom was paid remained controversial in public reporting. Lesson: Maintain a negotiation option, but never treat it as Plan A - clean backups remain the gold standard.
Caritas-Klinik Dominikus Berlin (February 2024). Recovery achieved without documented ransom payments, resulting however in weeks of severe operational limitations. Lesson: A robust backup strategy saves the ransom payment - but costs recovery time, which must be managed operationally and bridged through strategic communication.
MVZ Tirschenreuth/Kemnath (Autumn 2025). Multiple sites affected simultaneously due to the compromise of centralized IT infrastructure. Lesson: Distributed architectures and strictly segmented networks mitigate single points of failure - a centralized AD without replication boundaries constitutes a major single point of failure.
ChipSoft Netherlands (April 2026). A ransomware attack on electronic health record vendor ChipSoft forced numerous Dutch hospitals to sever connections and shut down patient portals - even though they were not attacked directly. Lesson: Supply chain risk is real and systemic - an attack on a vendor can impact a healthcare facility that did everything right internally. Vendor security under Section 30 (2) No. 4 BSIG is therefore far from a mere formality.
Conclusion
A ransomware incident in a clinic represents the most demanding crisis the German healthcare sector currently faces. The operational roadmap is clear - 30 minutes for containment, 24 hours for the initial notification, 72 hours for assessment, 1 month to the final report - but it succeeds only through thorough advance preparation.
The five critical levers: a documented crisis management team, a physical emergency binder, verified offline backups, an active forensics retainer, and annual tabletop exercises. Establish these five, and you will weather an incident. Neglect them, and you take substantial risks - financially, regulatorily, and reputationally.
NIS2 raises the stakes. Section 32 BSIG with its 24-hour / 72-hour / 1-month framework makes structured readiness an obligation - and executive liability toward the organization under Section 38 BSIG ensures that omissions carry direct consequences, well beyond the immediate operational impact.
Cybersecurity in a hospital is not an IT task; it is a clinical care priority. It belongs on the executive board's agenda, not in the help desk's inbox.
At Entropy CS, we support organizations in emergencies with Incident Response: initial triage via our incident hotline (Mon-Fri 9 AM-5 PM), remote containment, recovery support, and drafting of formal notifications under Section 32 BSIG and Art. 33 GDPR. Our free Risk Check takes 30 minutes and provides an objective evaluation of your incident readiness - highlighting specific gaps in crisis management, backup strategies, and reporting workflows.


